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By adjusting lending, banks can smooth the macroeconomic impact of deposit
fluctuations. This may, however, lead to extended periods of disproportionately high
lending relative to deposit intake and, under certain conditions, to the accumulation
of risk in the banking system. Using bank-level data for 8,477 banks in 129 coun-
tries for the period from 1992 to 2015, we examine how banks’ market power and
other characteristics may contribute to smoothing or amplification of shocks and the
accumulation of risk. We find that the higher their market power the lower is the
growth rate of lending relative to deposits. As a result, in periods of falling deposits
higher market power for the average bank is associated with a greater fall in lending,
consistent with amplification of adverse effects during relatively bad times. Strik-
ingly, at very high levels of market power, there is a threshold past which the effect
of market power on the growth rate of lending relative to deposits turns positive so
that “superpower” banks may contribute to the smoothing of adverse effects when
deposits are falling. In periods of rising deposits, however, such banks are more
likely to lead to amplification and accumulation of risk in the economy.
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1 Introduction
By adjusting their lending, banks may smooth or amplify the impact of deposit fluctu-
ations on corporate and individual borrowers and the macroeconomy as a whole. This,
however, could lead to extended periods of disproportionately high lending relative to
deposit intake and, under certain conditions, to the accumulation of risk in the banking
system. Indeed, previous work and recent experience have shown that banks can amplify
shocks or even create preconditions for financial instability by accumulating risks; ex-
cessive and sustained credit expansions build up risk in the economy over time and can
give rise to financial crises.1 As a regulatory response, Basel III, for example, includes
provisions to limit unsustainable excessive lending such as a mandatory, as of 2018, Net
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement.
Existing research points at market power as a prominent factor that governs banks’
decisions and lending in particular. However, the degree to which it affects smoothing
and/or risk accumulation is unclear, with theory and empirics producing mixed results.
Competition has been shown to both increase banking risks (Keeley, 1990), and to reduce
them (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). Allen and Gale (1997) theorize the importance of
market power for smoothing: competitive banks are deemed to fail to smooth shocks.
Much of the earlier literature focused on the willingness of banks to lend, while more
recent research, such as Ovtchinnikov (2010) for corporations in general, and Berger
et al. (2019) for banks in particular, demonstrates competition may also affect their
ability to fund lending. As smoothing and amplification are linked to both risk-taking
and fund-raising, a joint investigation is required. To this end, we ask to which extent
can the degree of banking competition determine smoothing-ability and how does this
1Jordà et al. (2013) show that credit expansions have been a driver of the depth of subsequent
recessions in advanced economies. Using the same 140-years long database from 1870 to 2008 for 14
advanced economies, Jordà et al. (2011) showed that credit growth has been the single best predictor of
financial instability.
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relate to the accumulation of risk in the macroeconomy.
More specifically, focusing on banks’ market power we ask which banks are less likely
to amplify shocks or accumulate risk via their prudence in lending during periods of
rising deposits, and which banks are more likely to smooth the impact of falling deposits.
It turns out that smoothing during booms, when deposits grow, comes at the cost of
amplification of adverse effects during periods of falling deposits, while the ability to
maintain lending during economic downturns is associated with amplification of positive
shocks and risk accumulation during periods of rising deposits.
The questions we ask here are arguably intriguing, not only because of the poten-
tially destructive consequences of risk accumulation within the banking system but also
because of the potential importance of banks’ smoothing ability for macroeconomic out-
comes.2 Smoothing by banks would enable inter-temporally optimizing agents to bring
consumption and investment forward, reflected in flatter consumption profiles directly
increasing current welfare, as well as in the growth-enhancing avoidance of temporary
declines in investment during relative bad times associated with falling deposits.
To answer the above questions, we will be using bank-level data for 8,477 banks in 129
countries over the period 1992-2015. The large variation in our data allows us to consider
a vast array of economic conditions faced by individual banks across different countries
over time. In particular, variation across the degree of competition faced by individual
banks in different environments over time enables us to investigate banks’ smoothing
ability and risk accumulation during periods of falling or rising deposits in relation to
the degree of competition they face. We estimate the Lerner index as a measure of
the degree of market power at the bank-year level using a semi-parametric functional
form.3 We obtain exogenous variation in market power using activity restrictions at the
2In Choudhary and Limodio (2017), e.g., an increase in deposit volatility translates into shortening
of loan maturities and through that lowers aggregate output.
3This takes into account the heterogeneity in the production technology across banks, countries, and
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country-year level as in Barth et al. (2013).
To measure smoothing and amplification, we introduce the lending-funding growth
gap, which is the difference between annual growth rates of loans and deposits. Conve-
niently, this measure also relates to the “customer funding gap” used in the literature
to characterize banks’ liquidity risk and to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) used
as a regulatory requirement to constrain the build-up of risk.4 As the impact of market
power on smoothing, amplification and risk accumulation has not previously been jointly
investigated, this constitutes the main focal point of our analysis.
A number of theoretical reasons suggest an inverse relationship between the degree
of competition and banks’ smoothing ability.5 In Allen and Gale (1997), competition
wipes out the ability of banks to create sufficient reserves to smooth fluctuations, while
in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2001, 2011) it limits profit-making and thus the ability
to cover current period losses, which are then transferred to future periods. The ability
of banks to smooth rates on loans offered to borrowers in Berlin and Mester (1999)
crucially depends on the ability to derive monopolistic rents in the deposit market. In
Boot and Thakor (2000), although competition between banks leads to more relationship
lending, it brings fewer benefits for borrowers; moreover, if banks compete with financial
markets, relationship lending shrinks. Sette and Gobbi (2015) review previous results for
the impact of competition on relationship lending which imply that higher competition
(lower concentration) dampens the smoothing effect of relationship lending.
time, and is estimated for 11,957 banks in 131 countries for 1988-2015.
4See, e.g., Albertazzi et al. (2014) for the characterization of banks’ liquidity risk through the customer
funding gap, and BoE (2009, 2011) for the usage of it as an indicator of risks to financial stability.
5There are two main foci in the literature: (1) relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berlin
and Mester, 1999; Boot and Thakor, 2000; Bolton et al., 2013; Sette and Gobbi, 2015; Beck et al., 2014)
and (2) intergenerational transfers (Allen and Gale, 1997; Gersbach and Wenzelburger, 2001, 2011;
Vinogradov, 2011). The first one is on the selection of borrowers where if the bank has to cut down
lending, established long-term clients suffer last. The second one is on the facilities enabling smoothing
by banks. These are either accumulated reserves or transfers of current period “deficits” into future
periods where current period losses are covered by short-term borrowing.
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To sum up: in the existing literature, banks’ mechanism to smooth lending consists of
two main elements: (1) availability of funds, either through accumulated reserves or via
borrowing from alternative sources, and (2) incentives to allocate these funds to existing
borrowers. Relationship lending contributes to the latter incentives, yet it is just one of
a number of possible channels. Although the empirical literature suggests market power
can affect relationship lending, no evidence exists for the role market structure plays for
the smoothing mechanism as a whole, which is what we explore here.
Estimating the impact of market power on the lending-funding growth gap, however,
is subject to endogeneity concerns. In this regard, we first note that the Lerner index we
use to measure market power contains lagged prices which are less likely to be affected
by future realizations of the difference in the growth rates of loans and deposits. To
further alleviate concerns of reverse causality for our estimation exercise, the explanatory
variables are lagged. To mitigate lingering concerns that a bank’s market power may be
spuriously correlated with its lending-funding growth gap, we use activity restrictions
as an instrumental variable to extract exogenous variation in market power as in Barth
et al. (2013). The presumption is that countries with higher activity restrictions create
fragmented markets that allow banks to exert monopolistic power.
Furthermore, to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit the multi-level
structure of our data set to mitigate omitted-variable bias in a fashion similar to Sette and
Gobbi (2015). More specifically, our bank-year-country sample allows the inclusion of
“high dimensional” bank, year and country*year*specialization fixed effects, saturating
our analysis from other unobserved heterogeneity within the bank (time-invariant), year
(common shocks) and country-year-specialization (time varying macroeconomic condi-
tions). As the omitted variable bias would amplify any endogeneity problems, our careful
treatment here also serves to further alleviate such concerns.
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We find that the higher the market power for the average bank, the lower is the
growth rate of lending relative to deposits. As a result, higher market power for the
average bank may act to amplify adverse effects during periods of deposit decline while
smoothing positive shocks and reducing the build-up of risk when deposits are growing.
At very high levels of market power, however, there is a threshold past which the effect of
market power on the growth rate of lending relative to deposits turns positive. Thus, for
“superpower” banks, market power improves smoothing-ability during periods of deposit
decline in relatively bad times while leading to amplification and to risk accumulation
when deposits are growing. Strikingly, amplification and risk accumulation during such
periods also characterize banks facing high competition. The much stronger effect of
market power we find for periods of deposit decline as compared to periods of deposit
growth, however, implies that the helpful role of competition and “superpower” when
deposits are falling matters more than their role for amplification and risk accumulation
when deposits are growing.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the basic theoretical
framework motivating our empirical analysis and derive testable hypotheses. Section
3 describes how we construct our dataset along with our estimation procedure. Main
empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses impli-
cations for corporate financial decisions, relationship banking, and the macroeconomy,
while section 6 briefly concludes.
2 The lending-funding growth gap
We begin this section by presenting our variable of interest, the lending-funding growth
gap, and showing how it relates to smoothing, amplification, and the build-up of liquidity
risk. We then discuss the potential effects of market power on the lending-funding growth
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gap. Auxiliary discussions and intermediate derivations are in Appendix A.
2.1 Smoothing, amplification, and risk accumulation
As financial intermediaries, banks accept deposits and provide loans. Since there is a
large number of customers on both sides of this process, idiosyncratic shocks to deposits
can typically be diversified out (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Bencivenga and Smith,
1991), rendering the overall deposit intake mostly dependent on systemic shocks. Our
question is, therefore, which banks possess a better capacity to protect their lending
function from these shocks to their funding arm, to which we refer as the “smoothing”
capacity. An opposite situation, when a funding shock translates into an even greater
shock to lending, may be referred to as “amplification”. We discuss the two effects in
more detail below.
Our main interest relates to the impact a change in deposits might have on a bank’s
lending, for which reason we will focus on the growth rates of the two variables.6 We
measure the sensitivity of lending to changes in deposits using the linear difference
between the loan and deposit growth rates7, which we call the lending-funding growth
gap,






where Lt and Dt are, respectively, the observed values of total loans and total deposits
a bank has in period t. We interpret the lending-funding growth gap as the sensitivity
6Drechsler et al. (2017) study the impact of a change in deposits on the lending function, yet their
focus is on lending growth, testing the impact of a change in the Federal Funds rate on lending through
deposits. Differences between the levels of long-term assets and short-term liabilities have been used in
the literature to describe the maturity transformation function of banks (see e.g. Flannery and James
(1984), or Brewer et al. (1996)). Differences between the levels of liquid and illiquid assets and liabilities
have been used to measure liquidity creation by banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2009).
7Alternatively, the sensitivity of lending to deposit shocks can be measured by the elasticity of lend-
ing to deposit inflow, as done for example in Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) with an emphasis on this
parameter’s relationship to bank capitalization. However, this measure is not well behaved for near-zero
deposit growth rates (note that the average rate of deposit growth in our sample is 8.22% per annum,
with a standard deviation of 19.93). See also further discussion in Appendix A.
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of loan growth to a change in deposit growth. If the latter is driven by an exogenous
shock, the change in the bank’s lending can be seen as a response to this shock. More
precisely, if LtDt is the previous period’s loans-to-deposits ratio, then condition lt−dt = 0
is equivalent to dedicating to new loans ∆Lt+1 = Lt+1−Lt exactly the same proportion
of the new intake of deposits, ∆Dt+1 = Dt+1 −Dt, as in period t:




Deviations from this, as given by lt − dt < 0 and lt − dt > 0, correspond to a sub-
proportional or a more-than-proportional increase in lending in response to a change in
deposits and will be the primary focus of our analysis. Note that the variable lt − dt
already takes into account that not every dollar of new deposits needs to be converted
to a new dollar of loans. Instead, it gives us a picture of whether more or fewer dollars
from each new deposit are used for lending in period t+ 1 as compared to period t.
Implications of having a positive or a negative lt − dt are different in situations of
falling or growing deposits. A positive growth gap, lt−dt > 0, means a lesser decline (or
even an increase) in lending than a given decline in deposits, dt < 0, and hence represents
smoothing provided by banks to an economy experiencing a shock that leads to a decline
in deposits. A negative growth gap under the same circumstances would instead imply
amplification of this shock, as lending would be declining faster than deposits. On the
other hand, when deposits go up, a negative lt−dt would dampen any impact of deposit
growth on the economy which is also a form of smoothing, while a positive lt− dt would
lead to amplification.
Figure 1 reflects this asymmetric interpretation of lt−dt in times of growing deposits
and in times of declining deposits. Figure 2 plots loan growth versus deposit growth in
the worldwide sample of banks we use later for the analysis, separately for banks with
low (below median) and high (above median) market power (see Section 3.2 for details).
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Figure 1: Loan growth (l) versus deposit growth (d).
Notes: Dashed line corresponds to l = d. The ability to generate more loans than acquired deposits,
l − d > 0, is interpreted as the accumulation of liquidity risk and at the same time as smoothing for
negative deposit shocks (d < 0) and as amplification for positive shocks (d > 0). Negative growth
mismatch, l − d < 0, corresponds to a reduction in liquidity risk and the opposite interpretation of
smoothing and amplification for d < 0 and d > 0 to the one described above for the l − d > 0 case.
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Figure 2: Loan growth versus deposit growth worldwide.
Notes: The figure plots loan growth versus deposit growth for individual bank/year observations with
below and above median market power, as measured by the Lerner index. Sources of data and variables
are defined in Section 3.2
For both types of banks, observations align around the 45◦ line, as introduced in Figure
1. Still, variations around this line are pronounced in both subsamples and include a
number of implications with regards to the smoothing/amplification capacity of banks.
These implications are highlighted in Figure 1. In particular, an increase in (lt − dt) in
times of declining deposits improves the smoothing capacity of banks or reduces their
contribution to the amplification of the business cycle; the opposite applies in times of
rising deposits.
The above considerations refer to the role banks play in driving the business cycle
in the short run, having in mind an instantaneous response of lending to a change in
deposits. In the long run, however, having persistently positive or persistently negative
lt − dt has implications for the build-up of liquidity risk, as measured by the relative
“customer funding gap”, Lt−DtLt . The latter is employed by policy-makers and researchers
Which Banks Smooth and at What Price? 10
alike as an indicator of the systemic risk (BoE, 2010; Allen et al., 2012; Albertazzi and
Bottero, 2014) and is related to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a core stability
indicator adopted as a standard minimum requirement in the Basel III framework since
January 2018, described in more detail in Appendix A.
2.2 Impact of market power
We now link the lending-funding growth gap to banks’ market power. Consider a bank
funded at time t by deposits Dt and other sources of finance Kt, such as interbank
borrowing, debt finance, and capital accumulation. Deposits are subject to exogenous
shocks. As they represent a significant portion of the bank’s liabilities, these shocks may
be transmitted to the bank’s investment decisions through the balance-sheet constraint.
The bank performs qualitative asset transformation and in doing so chooses fraction αt
of its funds to be invested in risky loans Lt, with the remainder invested in a diversified
portfolio of market securities:
Lt = αt · (Dt +Kt) . (3)
We denote kt =
Kt+1−Kt
Kt
the growth rate of funding from other sources, gt =
(Dt+1+Kt+1)−(Dt+Kt)
Dt+Kt




the percentage change in the fraction of loans in the bank’s portfolio from
t to t+1. Re-writing (3) in growth rates and subtracting dt, the growth rate of deposits,
from both sides yields




is the leverage parameter, referring to the bank’s current reliance
on “alternative funding” as a source of finance. Equation (4) relates our variable of
interest to the main parameters of the bank: portfolio adjustment at, overall balance
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sheet growth gt, leverage parameter φt, and “access to alternative (non-deposit) sources
of funding” kt. At the beginning of period t, parameter φt is fixed by the existing levels of
Kt and Dt and is independent of their growth. Thus, φt is not a forward-looking decision
variable. The right-hand side in (4) highlights that smoothing can be achieved via two
main channels: either through portfolio rebalancing (via changes in at), or through
borrowing/recapitalization by resorting to alternative non-deposit sources of funds (via
changes in kt).
8 If market power affects the lending-funding growth gap, it should affect
one or both of the above channels. This is what we are about to investigate.
A similar decomposition of the impact of market power on banks may be found
in studies of the relationship between competition and risk-taking. For the portfolio
channel, a large strand of the literature reviewed in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), suggests
competition drives banks into more risk-taking. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) propose this
relationship can reverse if the riskiness of assets is endogenous to banks’ pricing decisions.
Building on this, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) demonstrate the relationship is
inherently non-linear: on the one hand, banks with more market power can indeed
charge higher interest rates on loans, imposing higher risk of borrowers’ bankruptcy
(amplified by moral hazard), while on the other hand banks with higher market power
can use increased revenues from these higher rates to add capital, providing a buffer
against losses thus reducing banks’ riskiness. Monopolistic banks exhibit conservative
behavior as they value and want to preserve monopoly rents. The former “risk-shifting
effect” is thus counteracted by the latter “margin effect”. The former effect is part of the
portfolio rebalancing channel in our terminology, while the latter effect where revenues
8As Wheelock and Wilson (1995) note, “...significant deposit withdrawals may force a bank to borrow
against its loan portfolio or to sell assets.” In Choudhary and Limodio (2017), an increase in deposit
volatility acts as a risk factor for the portfolio choice, triggering an increase in the lending rate of long-
term loans through which the average maturity of the portfolio shortens in equilibrium. As only the
second moment of deposits changes in their set up, there is no change in the overall lending; access to
liquid funds, which corresponds to “alternative sources”, obliterates the effect.
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are used to top up capital, is part of the recapitalization channel. The channels cannot be
fully disentangled in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) as banks in their model decide
only on the supply of loans, which simultaneously affects the return and risk of the loan
portfolio as well as the revenue generated. Extending the set of a bank’s decision options
allows focusing on each of the channels separately. Below we discuss how each of them
can produce a non-linear relationship between market power and the lending-funding
gap. In our set up, the two channels will reinforce rather than offset each other.
The portfolio rebalancing channel
Portfolio rebalancing, captured by at in equation (4), refers to the bank’s choice
between the accumulation of liquid assets and selling liquid assets to facilitate lending.
A bank can potentially resort to this source of liquid funds at any point as long as
regulatory liquidity constraints are not binding. The decision to rebalance thus mainly
depends on the bank’s willingness to take on risks.
In Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), the “risk-shifting effect” arises through an
increase in the probability of a loan failure when interest rates on loans rise due to higher
market power. Conversely, the probability of a loan failure falls when interest rates on
loans drop due to higher competition. While higher competition ensures an increase in
aggregate lending, for the average bank the supply of loans shrinks as the number of
banks in the market increases. Thus, it would appear that all other factors being equal,
the same bank placed in a competitive market would offer fewer loans than it would offer
in a monopolistic environment, despite facing lower risk in a competitive loans market.
The question is how this same bank would respond to a change in its available resources,
such as a deposit outflow or inflow.
In this case, we would expect more competitive banks to exert more flexibility in
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adjusting their portfolios to support lending as they are less bound by risk considerations.
First, they are already operating in a lower risk environment, thus they may extend more
loans in response to an inflow of deposits, or prevent a reduction in lending by selling
marketable securities in response to an outflow. Second, the same market forces that
ensure lower loan rates would force competitive banks to use loanable funds for lending
rather than for creating additional reserves.
Banks in less competitive markets deal with higher risk, which would imply more
conservative behavior and less willingness to take on additional risk. We would thus
expect these banks to be less willing to sell liquid funds to support lending. Note that
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) obtain that in monopolistic markets, risk-shifting
induced by increasing market power plays an even more important role than revenue
generation from loan repayments. This reinforces our point that portfolio risk for these
banks is high and thus becomes a binding constraint for portfolio adjustments.
The above argument holds, however, only if risk indeed increases with market power.
This result in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) derives from the assumed relationship
between loan pricing and the quality of loans: moral hazard and adverse selection imply
that the probability of default increases in the loan rate. On top of affecting loan prices,
banks can affect the quality of their portfolio by other means: screening, monitoring and
improving the quality of borrower selection to avoid the adverse selection trap, are rather
standard examples. These tools counteract the risk-shifting effect of market power and
fall within the portfolio rebalancing channel in our set up. The margin effect suggested
by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) falls within the recapitalization channel in our
set up. We discuss this in the next sub-section.
While standard tools may be equally available to all banks, an important determinant
of loan portfolio quality is the choice of lender by borrowers: good quality borrowers
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may self-select to do business with a particular bank. Much of the literature focuses
on the firm’s choice between bank financing and publicly offered debt. In Yosha (1995)
good quality firms may prefer bank financing if having the bank as a single lender
ensures information about the firm’s business plans is not disclosed to competitors.
Leary (2009) emphasizes that larger firms can substitute bank financing with publicly
offered debt if banks change lending conditions. In Rajan (1992) banks monitor and
control firms’ investment decisions, yet also affect how profits are distributed between the
lender and the borrower; the latter makes firms turn away from banks. Arguably, banks
with high market power can offer these customers more flexible conditions to ensure
they will choose bank loans over publicly offered debt. This flexibility is emphasized in
the literature on relationship lending, where firms prefer ties with monopolistic banks
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995) because the latter may offer credit when needed and because
monopolistic banks can strategically misprice loans making them more attractive at the
beginning of the relationship (see also Degryse and Ongena (2005)). According to the
literature, these tools are more readily available to banks with higher market power.
Thus, we expect such banks to have a better choice of borrowers.9 While for banks
with middle-range market power these mechanisms may not be prevalent enough to
counteract the earlier discussed risk-shifting effect, more powerful “superpower” banks
would have an advantage in this case, allowing them to alleviate the risk problem and
thus use liquid assets to support lending during deposit downturns.
To sum up: competitive banks are price-takers, charge competitive rates on loans,
and are less affected by moral hazard and adverse selection problems so that they face
lower risk. However, these banks also face low profitability and market pressure to lend
more. Banks with some market power are capable of charging higher interest rates on
9See, e.g., Jiménez et al. (2013) who demonstrate using Spanish data that higher market power is
associated with less risky loans.
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loans but do not have enough market power to be very selective. Thus, these banks
may face a higher risk than competitive banks and might be less flexible in lending
decisions. Finally, superpower banks can be very selective and enjoy a higher variety
of tools that ensure a better quality of borrowers. These banks may also enter into
long-term relationships with borrowers, and can be more flexible regarding pricing and
lending decisions. The portfolio rebalancing channel thus implies a non-linearity in the
effect of market power on the lending-funding growth gap. That is, competitive banks
and “superpower” banks would be more able to support lending via their accumulated
liquid assets, as compared to banks with some limited market power.
The borrowing/recapitalization channel
The margin effect discussed in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) is based on the
assumption that banks with some monopolistic power use revenues from high non-
competitive loan rates to make loan loss provisions. For banks that enjoy a sufficiently
high level of market power, an increase in competition may have little impact on their
ability to create reserves. For more competitive banks, however, a further increase in
competition can be detrimental to the accumulation of reserves. This might explain why
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) find that the margin effect dominates in competitive
markets.
Since retained earnings and reserves are part of banks’ Tier I capital (see BIS (2010)),
we consider this risk management tool as falling within the “recapitalization” channel.
Note that along with providing a cushion against loan losses, retained earnings and
accumulated reserves may serve as a buffer to compensate for the outflow of deposits
if banks wish to maintain their level of lending. Other methods to support lending
available to banks, captured by kt in equation (4), include banks’ capital as well as funds
banks obtain by borrowing from other financial institutions (e.g., interbank borrowing)
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and from the wider market by issuing bonds and other securities. We can distinguish
between three scenarios:
1. The bank has no access to “alternative sources”, φt = 0 hence lt− dt = at (gt + 1),
so that smoothing can only be achieved through portfolio rebalancing as repre-
sented by changes in at. Here, the bank sells safe assets in order to grant more
loans.
2. The bank has limited access to “alternative sources”: these represent a non-
negligible fraction of funding, φt > 0, but cannot be endogenously changed in
the short term, kt = 0. To smooth the impact of a decline in deposits, this
bank needs to sell less safe assets than if it had no access to alternative sources:
lt − dt = at (gt + 1)− dt · φt. Here, alternative funding provides a cushion against
shocks through diversification of liabilities, thus lessening their impact on lending.
3. The bank has unconstrained access to “alternative sources”and can freely choose
the amount of funding obtained from such sources at any point in time, φt > 0 and
kt ∈ IR. Such banks can resort to alternative funds to compensate for the shortage
of deposits.
One of our central hypotheses to be tested is whether market power can help banks
reduce the impact of deposit fluctuations on lending. The three scenarios above demon-
strate this may be due to differences in banks’ ability to obtain funding from “alternative
sources”. For example, Fonseca and González (2010) provide empirical evidence of a
positive relationship between bank market power and their capital buffers.10 The main
reasons for market power to affect the ability of banks to raise funds are: reputation
10Analyzing implications of the no capital assumption for their model, Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010) note that “for sufficiently high franchise values bank shareholders may want to contribute some
capital in order to reduce the probability of losing the franchise” (p.3663), which also indicates that
higher market power makes it more likely that banks can get recapitalized.
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(as banks with higher market power are less likely to invoke reliability concerns on the
side of lenders), higher net present value (as banks with higher market power are usually
associated with better ability to screen and monitor borrowers), and competitive pres-
sure. The first two effectively reduce the cost of access to and utilization of alternative
sources of funds for banks with higher market power. As for the third one, Berger et al.
(2019) study the impact of competition on banks’ decisions to hold capital in excess of
regulatory requirements. They show that competitive banks, driven by the search for
growth opportunities, have higher target capital ratios and achieve this mainly through
active capital management including the issuance of new liabilities, repurchases, and
changes in dividend policy. They also find that competitive banks are more flexible and
adjust their capital faster.
While it may be true that banks with very high market power (“superpower” banks)
can manipulate the market and in particular use ties and connections to enable inflow
of funds when necessary, this would be less likely for banks that have some market
power but not enough to have strategic influence on other market participants. Bank-
ing sectors across the globe are usually not perfectly competitive, yet only a few banks
enjoy superpower. For the remainder of them, we expect that competition rather than
market power would force them to more actively manage their capital. Thus, the bor-
rowing/recapitalization channel induces a non-linearity in that competitive banks and
“superpower” banks are better equipped than banks in the middle of the market power
spectrum to obtain funds and facilitate lending.
Hypotheses
The portfolio rebalancing channel along with the borrowing/recapitalization channel
both imply a non-linearity in the relation between market power and smoothing ability.
The two channels reinforce each other and provide us with Hypothesis 1 below.
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Hypothesis 1 The impact of market power on the lending-funding growth gap is U-
shaped: higher market power reduces the gap except at very high levels of market power.
To disentangle the two channels, portfolio rebalancing and borrowing/recapitalization,
we note that banks would have different strategic considerations and incentives to seek
alternative funding depending on whether they expect an outflow of deposits or whether
deposits are projected to grow. The reason for this is the feasibility and cost of the two
mechanisms. Portfolio rebalancing is a reversible and often cheaper option due to the
liquid nature of assets involved.11 By contrast, a quick arrangement for an inflow of
funds from other non-deposit sources is not always feasible especially if these require is-
suing financial instruments like bonds or equity. Once financing arrangements are made,
these are irreversible until the maturity of debt instruments involved or until a buyout
is arranged.
When deposits fall, banks seek to activate both channels, borrowing/recapitalization
and portfolio rebalancing, and market power comes into play: “superpower” banks
can more easily arrange funding from alternative non-deposit sources via the borrow-
ing/recapitalization channel, and have reserves to re-balance. When deposits grow,
banks are not credit-constrained thus they are not as keen on looking for and/or ex-
ploiting existing sources of finance. Raising funds would exhaust sources of funding
that cautious banks would perhaps like to keep available for “bad times” when deposits
fall. Portfolio rebalancing remains, however, a feasible option. Competitive banks could
reduce safe assets to fund more loans as in the literature on competition-fragility. By
contrast, banks with higher market power already enjoy higher than competitive rev-
enues and have less of a need to use the momentum to generate extra profits. Costly
11Theoretically, to manage the quality of assets, especially when the resource base shrinks, banks may
call in loans which is highly costly. The existence of this option does not undermine our main argument:
while such a costly option exists, it is complemented by cheaper and easier solutions. It is the existence
of relatively cheap solutions that constitutes the core of our argument.
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access to funds would prevent them from expanding their lending even though risks are
lower. Nevertheless, “superpower” banks are unconstrained in their access to alternative
sources of funds so they can use these to exploit the momentum and raise their market
share.
Thus, we expect a non-linear relationship as in Hypothesis 1 for both booms and busts
in the deposit market, albeit with qualitative differences. Although dissimilarities across
banks with various degrees of market power may still exist during periods of deposit
growth, they would be less pronounced as compared to periods of falling deposits due to
the reasons analyzed above. This asymmetry can be informative about the roles of the
two channels, i.e., access-to-funds versus portfolio rebalancing. If alternative non-deposit
sources of funds via the ‘borrowing/recapitalization’ channel were negligible, as might
be implied, e.g., by the work of Drechsler et al. (2017), only the portfolio rebalancing
channel would matter and we would then expect a more symmetric response to deposit
growth and declines than we actually observe in the data.12
Hypothesis 2 The relationship between market power and the lending-funding growth
gap is asymmetric: it is stronger in periods of falling as compared to periods of rising
deposits.
An important take-away from this section is that a positive impact on the smoothing
variable during periods of deposit booms can be seen as amplification of shocks. However,
based on the preceding analysis, this may be less of a concern in terms of macroeconomic
effects as the impact of market power is expected to be smaller when deposits grow.
12The asymmetry we hypothesize in Hypothesis 2 and later report in Section 4 nevertheless suggests
that the access-to-funds (‘borrowing/recapitalization’) channel is non-negligible.
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3 Estimation and Data
3.1 Estimation
To assess the smoothing capacity of banks, we consider the sensitivity of the lending-
funding growth gap in relation to a bank’s market power and other bank and market
characteristics. We thus estimate the following regression equation as our baseline:
[GLi,j,t+1 −GDi,j,t+1] = αf +MPi,j,t +MP 2i,j,t +Xi,j,t + Zj,t + εi,j,t (5)
where the difference in the growth rates between loans (GLi,j,t+1) and deposits (GDi,j,t+1)
for bank i in country j between periods t and t+1 is regressed on market power (MPi,j,t),
market power squared (MP 2i,j,t) to capture non-linear effects, a vector of bank character-
istics Xi,j,t including non-performing loans, bank size and other bank-specific controls,
a vector of country characteristics Zj,t including concentration ratios, the GDP growth
rate to capture business cycle effects on net loan growth, and other country-specific con-
trols.13 Finally, αf denotes a vector of fixed effects, while ε is a bank-country-level shock
capturing stochastic disturbances.
In equation (5), reverse causality could emerge if the difference in the growth rates
of loans and deposits affects our measure of market power. The literature commonly
employs lagged explanatory variables to mitigate endogeneity issues that emerge due to
reverse causality (e.g., Beck et al. (2013)). To alleviate concerns of reverse causality, all
the right-hand side variables except non-performing loans are lagged once. In addition,
we use activity restrictions and supervisory power at the country-year level in order to
obtain exogenous variation in market power as in Barth et al. (2013). The presumption
here is that countries with higher activity restrictions and supervisory power create
13We change notation at this point to emphasize the distinction between equation (4) that provides a
theoretical justification of the two main channels via which market power can affect net loan growth, and
the empirical approach chosen to test the relationship as given in regression (5). Market power enters
the latter explicitly while it only implicitly affects the components on the right-hand side of the former.
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fragmented markets that might allow banks to exert monopolistic power due to their
specialization.
As the bank’s lending portfolio depends on loan quality, we would expect the differ-
ence in the growth rates of loans versus deposits to positively depend on loan quality.
To account for this, in the subsequent analysis we control for loans’ quality as proxied
by the share of non-performing loans (NPLs) at the beginning of each period t. The
rationale for including NPLs is that when the prevalence of non-performing loans in the
economy is low, banks would need to make less provisions which would enable them to
increase loan growth for any given rate of deposit growth. The portfolio choice of the
bank depends on the quality of loans; the higher the latter, the more likely the bank is
to substitute falling deposits with funds obtained through sales of safe assets in order
to reduce the impact on the total quantity of loans provided. Assuming the quality of
loans can be captured by the percentage of non-performing loans, banks with low NPLs
should be more likely to provide effective smoothing. As a robustness check, we also
consider loan loss provisions made by bank i in country j at time t−1, as an alternative
to non-performing loans. We expect a weakened effect of the quality of previous loans
on current lending decisions in periods when deposits grow, to the extent that the latter
is associated with an improvement in economic conditions and a general reduction in
economic risks.
We would also expect larger banks to have better access to alternative funds and to
thus be more likely to provide effective smoothing. This could be due to scale economies
that reduce the relative cost of relevant arrangements on them. Noting that size is
endogenous to past profit growth which is in turn related to market power, having
included a direct measure of the evolution of market power over time, size will thus
largely capture aspects driving lending relative to deposit growth unrelated to market
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power. Thus, the main role of size would, in this case, be via its cost-reducing effect on
banks’ access to funding. If the benefits banks derive from economies of scale and scope
are asymmetric between the lending and funding arms, and the channels (rebalancing
versus borrowing/recapitalization) are differently activated when deposits go up or down,
we ought to observe a differential impact of bank size on our main variable of interest.
We expect economies of scale to be more pronounced in lending activities (large banks
have advantages in attracting new borrowers) than in funding (reputation aside, large
banks may save on costs of searching for potential funders, yet securing a large amount of
funding may be more complicated). With this in mind, if the borrowing/recapitalization
channel was of lower importance and portfolio rebalancing was the major mechanism
governing net loan growth (l− d) when deposits grow, then we should expect economies
of scale and hence the size of financial institutions to matter more in periods of growing
deposits than in periods of declining deposits. A similar argument, with an opposite sign,
would apply if economies of scale were more pronounced for funding than for lending
activities. The empirical literature leaves us largely agnostic with regards to activity-
specific scale economies, however we can expect an asymmetric role of size, depending
on whether deposits grow or decline.
As our theoretical predictions are different for episodes of declining and growing de-
posits, we estimate the above equation for two subsamples, where bank-year observations
are split according to the sign of the deposit growth variable. That is, we consider the
behavior of GLi,j,t+1−GDi,j,t+1 during episodes of falling and rising deposits separately.
This can potentially help uncover important asymmetries in line with our theoretical
exposition in the previous section.
Finally, omitted variable bias could arise if there were unobserved bank-country-
year factors affecting banks’ market power (e.g., specific unobserved elements of the tax
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system, ability to carry out profit shifting and/or portfolio diversification). On this front,
the structure of our sample allows the inclusion of bank, year, and country×year×specialization
high dimensional fixed effects. These fixed effects saturate our analysis from other unob-
served heterogeneity within bank (time-invariant), year (common shocks) and country-
year-specialization (time-varying macroeconomic conditions). As omitted variable bias
would amplify any endogeneity problems, our careful treatment here also serves to fur-
ther alleviate such concerns.
3.2 Data
For the construction of the dataset, we rely on Bankscope as our primary source of bank-
level data. Our data set includes data for 8,477 banks in 129 countries, available annually
for the period 1992-2015. We exclude earlier years because of concerns associated with
coverage and accounting issues. We include only countries that have at least three banks
in each year of our panel. Our focus is on commercial, savings and cooperative banks.
We exclude real estate and mortgage banks, investment banks, other non-banking credit
institutions, specialized governmental credit institutions, and bank-holding companies.
The excluded institutions are less dependent on the traditional intermediation function
and have a different financing structure compared to our focus group. In short, our
focus in this study is on banks carrying out traditional banking activities. We apply
three further selection rules to avoid including duplicates in our sample.14
First, even though we do not include bank-holding companies, we still need to exclude
double entries between parent banks and subsidiaries. We use either the consolidated or
the unconsolidated statement depending on which one is available. This is a non-trivial
process that requires the re-examination of all banks on an individual basis to avoid
double-counting. Notably, there are cases of banks with subsidiaries in domestic or in
14As argued in Delis et al. (2016), this is a key part of the sample-selection process absent from most
empirical studies using the Bankscope database.
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foreign countries and one should be careful to avoid double-counting of subsidiaries that
are established, e.g., in foreign countries.15
Second, we account for mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We went through all the
M&As one-by-one and made sure that both banks appear separately in the sample before
the M&A and only the merged entity or the acquiring bank is included in the sample
after the event. For example, if bank A and bank B merged in 2005, we create a new
entity AB after 2005 and exclude the separate financial accounts of A and B that might
still be reported for some time after the merger. We identify M&As and their timing
using Bankscope and the websites of the merging parties. Third, in the US there are
many distinct banks that have the same name but are active in a different state. To
solve this issue, we relate the value of total assets of, say, bank i in the last year this
bank appears in our sample with Bankscope’s identification number for bank i. This
also allows avoiding problems with our procedure concerning M&As described above.
As a final step, we winsorized our sample from outliers at 1% (Delis et al. (2016)).
Sources of the variables used in the empirical analysis and their definitions are sum-
marised in Table 1. Table 2 presents summary statistics. In Appendix C1, we addition-
ally present the total number of banks in our sample by year, and the correlations of the
main variables.
[Please insert Table 1 about here]
15Let us provide some examples to clarify this point. Assume that bank A1 is the parent bank with a




1 are subsidiaries and unconsolidated (U) statement.
If we include all banks in our sample we will have 3 duplicates. Hence, we need to subtract either the
percentage of the subsidiaries or to exclude the subsidiaries from the sample. The former solution is
not feasible because we do not have enough information for the percentage and the time duration of the
ownership of the subsidiaries, thus we resort to the latter solution. Two other examples for the case
of banks with foreign subsidiaries that we account for using the same strategy are (i) B1 is a parent
bank with a C statement, B11 is a subsidiary bank operating in the domestic market with a C or a U
statement and B1,11 is a sub-subsidiary bank operating in the domestic market and (ii) B1 is a parent
bank with C statement, B21 is a subsidiary bank operating abroad with a C or a U statement and B
2,1
1
is a sub-subsidiary bank operating in the domestic market with a U statement.
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[Please insert Table 2 about here]
3.3 Measures of market power
The measurement of market power has received much attention in the literature. The
Lerner index (Lerner (1934a)) remains a popular measure of market power due to its





where Pijt and MCijt are the price of bank output i in country j at time t and the
marginal cost of the production of this output, respectively. The Lerner index ranges
between zero and one, with zero corresponding to perfect competition and larger values
reflecting more market power (and less competition). The index can also be negative if
Pijt < MCijt, which is of course not sustainable in the long run.
The Lerner index has a number of characteristics that make it an appealing measure
of market power. First, it measures departures from the competitive benchmark of
marginal cost pricing. This makes it a simple and intuitively appealing index of market
power (competition). Second, it is perhaps the only structural indicator of market power
that can be estimated at the bank-year level. This is quite important for the purposes
of our study, as the unit of our analysis is at the bank-country-year level. Third, as
Beck et al. (2013) argue, the Lerner index is a good proxy for current and future profits
stemming from pricing power. Moreover, it captures both the impact of pricing power
on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet and the elements associated with the cost
efficiency on the liability side.
Constructing the Lerner index requires knowledge of marginal costs. When this
information is unavailable, marginal costs can alternatively be obtained by econometric
estimation. A popular approach has been to estimate a translog cost function and take
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its derivative to obtain the marginal cost. Recent work has shown that one can improve
on this using semiparametric or nonparametric methods that allow for more flexibility
in the functional form (Delis et al., 2014, 2016). We follow the approach from Delis et al.
(2016), and report annual averages of the Lerner index in Table C4 of the Appendix. In
Appendix B, we provide details for the semiparametric estimation of a log-linear cost
function.
The semi-parametric nature of the method implies no global assumptions need to
be made regarding the functional form of the cost equation. We just make assump-
tions in local neighborhoods of observations, which is important given how difficult it
is to be certain about the validity of any chosen functional form. The flexibility of the
semiparametric technique also allows using large international samples of banks from
different countries, without being concerned that certain banking markets in different
countries or banks within the same country face or adopt different production technolo-
gies. Hence, this approach can take into account the heterogeneity in the production
technology across banks, countries, and time.16
4 Results
4.1 Market power and smoothing
Our baseline regression equation (5) serves to assess the potentially non-linear effect
of market power stated in Hypotheses 1 and 2. However, in order to emphasize the
importance of considering the non-linear effect of market power, we begin by considering
a shorter specification omitting non-linearities and other theory-implied variables next.
This will then serve for comparison with the results arising from estimating the more
complete specification described in equation (5).
16We examine the sensitivity of our results to the use of different variants of the traditional Lerner
index and other alternatives measures of market power like the Boone indicator.
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The first specification we estimate, shown in column I of Table 3, considers the
effect of the Lerner index on the lending-funding growth gap controlling only for loan
quality and time effects, omitting non-linearities and other theory-implied variables.
Subsequently, we allow for country, specialization, and bank fixed effects (column II),
and the interaction of the first two with time effects (column III).
In Table 3, we find that higher market power reduces the lending-funding growth
gap. This can occur via a greater fall in lending for banks with higher market power as
deposits fall, or via a lower increase in lending as deposits increase. This is consistent
with the negative impact of marker power on the lending-funding gap that forms part
of Hypothesis 1. However, these estimates cannot inform us about the essential part of
Hypothesis 1 that pertains to the presence of non-linearities, as they do not capture the
case of “superpower” banks.
[Please insert Table 3 about here]
The separate estimation for periods of declining and growing deposits (“Deposits
DOWN”and “Deposits UP”, respectively in the table) confirms the above-described
finding, yet this linear estimate lends little support to our Hypothesis 2 which predicted
that the role market power plays in episodes of deposit outflows is greater than in periods
of deposit outflows. This particular asymmetry is not evident when we compare columns
IV-VI to columns VII-IX of Table 3. As we show next, this is due to the omission of the
non-linear term here, suggesting non-linearity is crucial for this type of analysis.
We also find that an increase in non-performing loans limits a bank’s ability to extend
loans relative to its deposit inflows. In all specifications, the coefficients for the NPL
variable have larger absolute values when deposits decline, consistent with our priors:
the impact of the quality of loans on banks’ smoothing ability appears stronger in periods
of deposit decline. Our results are robust to controlling for a number of fixed effects,
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including country×year×specialization effects. This is evident in columns I-III of Table
3, as well as in columns IV-VI and VII-IX where we consider periods of declining and
rising deposits, respectively.
Our baseline specification is given by regression equation (5) results for which are
reported in Table 4. This extends the specification estimated in Table 3 by including
a number of variables implied by theory, as motivated in our theoretical exposition
previously. This involves the inclusion of bank-specific size and the country-specific
business cycle over time, as well as the inclusion of the squared term of the Lerner index
that allows for non-linear dependence of the lending-funding growth gap on market
structure as postulated in Hypothesis 1.
As shown in Table 4, the square of the Lerner index enters positively implying that
at high levels of bank market power, the negative impact of market power on net loan
growth can be reversed. That is, at very high levels of market power, there is a threshold
level past which the effect of market power on loan growth relative to deposits growth
turns positive. This threshold is estimated, for example, to be equal to 0.37 in periods
of deposit decline as shown in column VI of Table 4. The latter value is approximately
one standard deviation above the mean value of the Lerner index for the banks in our
dataset, with just 5 percent of banks in our dataset above this market power value.
The above effect of market (super) power on the lending-funding growth gap may
be related to smoothing in the presence of falling deposits, and relates to amplification
and risk accumulation over time in the case of rising deposits. For the great majority
of banks, however, with levels of market power below the above-mentioned threshold
value, the effect of market power on our main variable of interest is consistent with
amplification of adverse effects during episodes of falling deposits, and with smoothing
and a reduction in the build-up of risk during episodes of rising deposits. To distinguish
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between the impact of market power on smoothing versus amplification that applies to
most banks and to “superpower” banks, we consider separately episodes of falling and
rising deposits.
When we do so, we see that the impact of market power appears stronger during
episodes of deposit outflows as compared to periods of rising deposits. This is evident
in Table 4 comparing columns IV-VI with the respective columns VII-IX in each case,
supporting our Hypothesis 2. This asymmetric effect of market power apparent in the
second row of Table 4 suggests that the adverse role of market power for the average bank
on smoothing when deposits are falling, matters more than the positive role of market
power for the average bank on smoothing when deposits are growing.17 Moreover, since
in episodes of deposit outflows there is also a starker contrast between “superpower”
banks and the other banks, indicated by a larger positive quadratic term in row 3 of
Table 4 comparing columns IV-VI to columns VII-IX, the presence of “superpower”
banks in a financial system will matter more for smoothing when deposits fall than for
amplification during periods of rising deposits.
[Please insert Table 4 about here]
Moreover, as we can also see in Table 4, an increase in non-performing loans reduces
the bank’s ability to extend loans relative to its deposit inflows, and apparently more
so during periods of falling deposits. We note that this is more evident in specifications
without GDP growth reported in columns V and VI for falling deposits and columns
VIII and IX for rising deposits, where GDP growth is replaced respectively by country-
year and country-year-specialization fixed effects. In these cases, the quality of loans
evidently affects the l − d gap differently depending on whether deposits grow or fall.
17More precisely, we refer here to the negative impact of market power on amplification associated
with lt − dt during episodes of deposit growth.
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Furthermore, the positive contribution of GDP growth to the lending-funding gap both
when deposits decline and when they grow (in columns I, IV and VI) is consistent with
lending exhibiting positive co-movement with the country’s business cycle, but also with
medium-term output growth reducing overall risks and thus contributing to lending via
portfolio re-balancing.
Finally, bank size typically affects lt−dt positively, and more strongly so in periods of
growing deposits. As shown in Table 4, this effect is smaller and statistically insignificant
during periods of falling deposits. We note that as the Lerner index is included in the
regressions in addition to bank size, the coefficient of bank size does not relate to market
power here.18 The estimated asymmetry here implies that aspects of size unrelated to
market power, such as economies of scale, do not affect the lending-funding gap during
periods of falling deposits, while having strong positive effects on it in periods of rising
deposits. Based on our exposition in section 3.1, this is then consistent with economies
of scale working more via the rebalancing channel while having no significant impact
via the recapitalization channel. This underscores the dichotomy between market power
effects, for which we have already identified a non-negligible borrowing/recapitalization
channel, and economy of scale (bank size) effects which mainly work through the portfolio
rebalancing channel related to the asset side of the balance sheet.
Overall, our baseline results in Table 4 support our Hypothesis 1 that more market
power reduces the ability of the average bank to smooth deposit outflows while raising
the ability of superpower banks to do so. Our baseline results also support Hypothesis
2 that the effect of market power on the lending-funding growth gap is asymmetric,
with periods of falling deposits associated with the stronger impact of market power as
compared to periods of rising deposits. These effects of market power are robust across
18Conversely, the estimated coefficients for the Lerner index capture market power aspects that affect
loans relative to deposit growth but are not associated with the present size of the bank.
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specifications.
4.2 Exogenous variation in market power due to regulatory changes
The economic mechanism we propose is that higher market power for the average bank
may act to amplify adverse effects during periods of deposit decline, while smoothing
positive shocks and reducing the build-up of risk when deposits are growing. One con-
cern, however, is that banks market power might be determined simultaneously with the
growth rates of loans and deposits. Differently phrased, one may raise doubts about the
extent to which our results are solely driven by market power. In this subsection, we
introduce an instrumental-variables (IV ) methodology to address this concern.
To yield exogenous variation in market power, we follow Barth et al. (2013) in using
activity restrictions at the country-year level. The activity restrictions index is defined
as the regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in (i) securities activities, (ii)
insurance activities, (iii) real estate activities, and (iv) bank ownership of non-financial
firms, with higher values reflecting more stringent restrictions. In addition, we use
supervisory power that similarly reflects whether the supervisor has the authority to
take specific action to prevent or correct problems.
In this manner, we exploit variation in banks’ market power that is due to a recent
change in activity restrictions or supervisory power. Our instruments are likely to satisfy
the exclusion restriction because they affect banks’ activities and actions in each country.
We expect that countries with higher activity restrictions will create fragmented markets
that might allow banks to exert monopolistic power due to their specialization. In
addition, it seems less likely that these restrictions would affect banks funding gaps
directly. One way that these indexes could be correlated with the funding gap is through
common macroeconomic developments that tend to move together. We thus control for
real GDP growth in our specification.
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We conduct the IV -analysis using a two-stage least squares model with bank and
year fixed effects. In Table 5, columns I-III, we replicate the baseline results of Table
4 using our instruments. In all specifications, we control in the first-stage regressions
for the bank-country control variables and bank and year fixed effects.19 The first-stage
results in panel A are as expected and in line with Barth et al. (2013). We report the
p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher
than 0.1 in order to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 10% level. The first stage
coefficients and the Hansen test of over-identified restrictions show that there are no
concerns regarding the validity of the instruments.
Panel B, presents the second stage estimates using the estimated values of the Lerner
index and the Lerner index squared. The estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar compared to our baseline specification. Moreover, the statistical significance and
inference on the non-linear relationship are very similar, with the turning point now
equal to 0.31 in periods of deposit decline as shown in column II of Table 5.
4.3 Components
By definition, the variation in lt−dt over time is due to changes in either of its two com-
ponents.20 Our argument refers to the degree to which banks adjust lending in response
to a given change in deposits. Market power then affects the ability and willingness of
banks to grant loans when the flow of deposits changes. It is, however, possible that mar-
ket power also affects the inflow of deposits itself. To better identify the role of market
power, we thus consider its effect on each of its two components, lt and dt, separately.
19We cannot include bank×year effects as these would completely absorb the country-year variation
of our instruments.
20We note that lt−dt does not differentiate between banks that sharply reduce lending due to a minor
deposit outflow and those that keep lending unchanged when deposits grow, nor between banks that leave
lending unchanged after a fall in deposits and those that sharply increase lending after a minor deposit
inflow. To this effect, we have considered periods of declining deposits and rising deposits separately in
the previous sub-section and Tables 3 and 4.
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The component analysis presented in Table 6 demonstrates that market power affects
lending much more strongly than it affects deposit-taking. In all specifications, the
coefficient of the Lerner index for loan growth is at least twice as high as that for deposit
growth. Moreover, the significance of this coefficient for loan growth remains strong
at the 1% level throughout, while for deposits growth this is only 10% in the model
controlling for country × year × specialization fixed effects shown in column VI of Table
6. Our findings here show that the adverse impact of market power for the average bank
on loan growth is substantially bigger than its impact on the rate of growth of deposits.
It follows that the impact of market power for the average bank on lt − dt is primarily
via its impact on the rate of growth of loans rather than deposits. Evidently, market
power has its primary effect on smoothing via the lending channel. This is the case for
banks with average market power, but as we can see by comparing the non-linear effect
of the Lerner index on loan growth in the 3rd row of Table 6 (columns I-III) versus on
deposit growth (columns IV-VI), this is also the case for “superpower” banks.
[Please insert Table 6 about here]
4.4 Maturity mismatch and type of loans
One intrinsic source of bank risk arises because their assets typically have a longer
maturity than their liabilities (maturity transformation). In particular, the use of short-
term deposits to finance long-term lending increases risk in the banking system. Having
assembled data on deposits and loans maturities, we now consider these as proxies for
the quality of liabilities and assets. In columns I and II of Table 7, we conduct an
analysis comparable to the baseline reported in Table 4, but constructing the lending-
funding growth gap using the subset of banks that report deposits with maturity longer
than one year and loans with maturity longer than one year, respectively. This reduces
our sample dramatically by several times relative to the baseline estimation exercise.
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Nevertheless, our estimates for the impact of market power and market power squared
remain qualitatively the same.
In the remaining specifications in columns III-VI of Table 7, we consider different
types of loans to assess whether market power has a similar impact on the lending-
funding growth gap constructed using growth rates for a particular type of loan. For
these regression equations, we reconstruct the dependent variable replacing total loan
growth with the growth rate of corporate, personal, and mortgage loans respectively.21
This allows us to examine the effect of the Lerner index on the specific type of loan
funding gap, controlling for bank and country * year fixed effects. Our estimates imply
qualitatively similar results to the baseline ones regarding the effect of market power on
the lending-funding growth gap, but quantitatively a somewhat lower impact of market
power for corporate as compared to personal or mortgage loans.
[Please insert Table 7 about here]
4.5 Domestic demand and loan quality
The previous sections document the existence of the competition-funding gap relation-
ship and offer insights into the drivers of this variation. However, one could argue that
the results are driven by domestic demand omitted factors or from the forward-looking
time variation in the quality of loans for each bank, beyond the variation previously
accounted for by including a measure of GDP growth and NPLs respectively. To this
end, we attempt in this section to further alleviate these concerns.
Table 8 shows alternative specifications that control for country-level demand fac-
tors and alternative measures for banks’ credit quality. In column I, we replace GDP
growth with the annual growth (%) of domestic demand made available by the OECD.
21Corporate are loans and leases to corporate and commercial enterprises. Personal are loans and
leases to individuals, either unsecured or secured by assets other than residential property. Mortgage
are loans secured by residential property.
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This accounts for the direct impact of demand-related omitted factors as it measures fi-
nal consumption, investment and stock building expenditures by the private and general
government sectors in real terms. The results are very similar to the baseline results pro-
viding evidence that the inclusion of country*year fixed effects can saturate our analysis
from time-varying country omitted factors.
In column II, we add loans and advances to banks in the interbank market at the
bank-year level. This controls for banks’ responses to changes in their loan opportunity
set (net supplier) and for changes in the source of funding (net receiver). The coeffi-
cients of the variables of interest are again quantitatively and qualitatively similar to
our baseline estimation results.
In columns III-V of Table 8, we replace non-performing loans with alternative proxies
for loan quality at the bank-year level. In column III, we add Reserves for Impaired
Loans/ Impaired Loans. The higher this ratio is, the better and the more comfortable
one should feel about the capital base. This measure is related to a forward-looking
approach. In column IV, we add Impaired Loans/ Gross Loans. This is a measure of the
ratio of total loans that are impaired or doubtful. The lower this figure is the better the
asset quality. In column V, we add loan-loss provisions to control directly for credit risk.
The resulting estimates reported in columns III-V of Table 8 are again quantitatively
similar to our baseline estimation results.
[Please insert Table 8 about here]
4.6 Bank size and risk
In the specifications considered in Table 9, we dig deeper into potential differences in
bank size and risk that might influence our estimated impact of market power on the
lending-funding growth gap. In columns I and II, we subdivide the sample into High
and Low for bank size above or below the mean, respectively. While the impact of
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market power is clearly present and significant in each subsample, the non-linearity of
this effect fades. This is not surprising given small banks are less likely to have high
market power - see, for example, Bikker et al. (2006) and references therein for the
predominantly positive relationship between bank size and market power. Given that
we found a parabolic relationship between market power and the lending-funding growth
gap, and that the turning point has been estimated to be rather high (with the impact of
market power reversing only for superpower banks, less than 5 per cent of our sample),
subdividing the sample implies we are left with the decreasing part of the parabola in
the small-size subsample, yielding the insignificant quadratic term in column II in Table
9. As for the high-size subsample, which contains both the truncated decreasing part
and the increasing “superpower” part, the non-linearity is still detectable albeit both
coefficients now have lower significance as can be seen in column I of Table 9. We note
that in our baseline estimates we had included bank size as a control variable, thus the
effects of market power reported earlier were net of the bank size effect. The subsample
analysis in columns I and II in Table 9 confirms that size indeed matters, yet the net
market power effect in our earlier estimates is of greater relevance.
In columns III-V of Table 9, we include both a measure of size and a direct measure
of risk in addition to NPLs and to our measure of market power that in part capture risk
in our pre-existing specifications. We follow Beck et al. (2013) and Laeven and Levine
(2009) among others and use the natural logarithm of the Z-score as a measure of banks’
risk. The Z-score measures the distance from insolvency and is calculated as:




where ROA is the return on assets of bank i at time t, E/A denotes the equity to asset
ratio and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets. We use a three-year
rolling time window (column III) to compute the standard deviation of ROA to allow for
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time variation in the denominator of the Z-score. Similarly, we calculate the standard
deviation of return on assets with a four-years (column IV) and five-years rolling time
window (column V) for robustness. A higher Z-score implies a more sound bank with
a lower probability of default. We find that our main results regarding market power
remain qualitatively robust when including a direct measure of risk as an explanatory
variable.
[Please insert Table 9 about here]
4.7 Banking Crises
Next, we consider a banking crisis variable that serves to proxy for the presence of credit
constraints and episodes of low confidence from depositors. Acknowledging what is now
widely accepted among macroeconomists and policy-makers alike, i.e., that banking
crises are endogenous to prior excessive credit expansion in the banking system, we still
find it useful to examine the relationship between banking crises and lending for two
main reasons. First, the potentially shock-smoothing behavior of banks is especially
critical for current and future welfare during extreme adverse events such us banking
crises. Second, while banking crises can be endogenous to past (prior-to-crisis) lending
behavior of banks, it is unlikely that the occurrence of banking crises is due to future (or
even contemporaneous) lending behavior of any one bank. In our application, we take
two annual lags of the banking crisis variable in order to alleviate potential endogeneity
of our crisis measure arising due to the effect of past lending on it. Our banking crises
measure comes from Laeven and Valencia (2018) who construct a dummy variable that
equals one when a country suffers from a banking crisis.
Viewing crises as potential shocks to an individual bank’s lending ability, we include
an interaction of the banking crisis proxy with the bank-specific Lerner index to help us
understand how the impact of market power on lt− dt differs between normal and crisis
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periods. We present results from this estimation exercise in Table 10.
Our main hypothesis in this paper has been that individual banks respond differently
to deposit shocks, depending on their degree of market power. Indeed, this appears to
be the case during banking crises, yet in a manner that differs from normal periods. In
all specifications in Table 10, interacting the linear and the quadratic Lerner index terms
with the crisis dummy inverts thus counteracts the respective average effects (see terms
without interaction for which the size and sign of coefficients are consistent with the
baseline estimates of Table 4). The resulting non-linear relationship during crises thus
differs from that in non-crisis times. The overall effect of market power on net lending is
negative for most banks during crises and “superpower” banks are no exception in this
case as the negative coefficient for the resulting quadratic terms in crisis periods implies
a downward sloping parabolic relationship for high values of the Lerner index. This is in
sharp contrast to non-crisis periods when market power works differently for superpower
banks than for the rest, enabling them to outperform banks in the mid-range of the
Lerner index in smoothing the impact of deposit outflows on lending.22
We also note that the impact of market power is again greater during periods of
deposit decline as compared to periods of increasing deposits, as can be seen in rows (2)
to (5) of Table 10 by comparing columns IV-VI respectively to columns VII-IX in each
case. Nevertheless, this difference becomes less pronounced during banking crises, even
though [some] banks may still enjoy an inflow of deposits then. This underscores that
while under normal economic conditions market power matters for banks’ ability (and
22Arguably, crises may serve to remove any advantages of “superpower” banks as they are systemic
events affecting the whole market. More specifically, the advantages of superpower discussed previously
were access to funding and the ability to find good quality borrowers. The first advantage is most
probably there - “superpower” banks can find extra capital when needed. However, on the lending side,
they face the same problem as other banks in the country: the economy in downturn, high risks and
interest rates reflecting this high systemic risk, and no credit-worthy lenders willing to borrow at these
high rates. At the same time, “superpower” banks are not willing to reduce rates as risks are high, hence
no advantage of superpower, while in normal times they were able to offer better rates and attract more
borrowers.
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willingness) to suppress the impact of deposit outflows on lending, crises hit them all
equally, apart from, perhaps, the least powerful banks.
[Please insert Table 10 about here]
4.8 Country-level indicators for the institutional environment
One set of country traits that can influence the competition-funding gap relationship is
the institutional framework in the country within which banks operate. The institutional
framework may affect the scope for adverse selection and moral hazard by banks, which
is one of the crucial ingredients in the model of the lending-funding growth gap. First, we
consider an indicator for legal rights developed by Kauffmann et al. (2010) (World Bank),
which captures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society. These include perceptions of the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary
and the enforceability of contracts. The index ranges between two and nineteen across
the countries in our sample, with higher values suggesting higher legal rights protection.
Banks operating in countries with weak legal rights may, for example, find it difficult to
expand their loan portfolios to take on additional risks.
A second group of potentially relevant country traits in the context of our empirical
exercise concerns creditor rights. González (2016) provides evidence that protection of
creditor rights has a positive impact on bank charter value and prevents risk-seeking
behavior if charters are eroded. As higher protection of rights may influence the relation
between market power and the funding gap, we control for creditor rights. We use an
index introduced by Djankov et al. (2007) that ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to
four (strong creditor rights) and is constructed annually from 1992 to 2015.23
23In Djankov et al. (2007) a score of one is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders
are defined in laws and regulations: First, there are restrictions such as creditor consent or minimum
dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors can seize their collateral
after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e. there is no “automatic stay” or “asset freeze.” Third,
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The results in column I of Table 11 show a positive and significant coefficient for
the interaction of legal rights and the Lerner index, indicating that legal rights dimin-
ish the negative impact of the Lerner index. Moreover, the coefficient is negative and
significant for the interaction of legal rights with the squared Lerner index. Considering
the interaction of creditor rights with the Lerner index in column II of Table 11, we
observe qualitatively similar results, but stronger and more strongly significant, to those
in column I. The results suggest that good protection of legal and especially creditor
rights can turn the impact of market power on the lending-funding growth gap positive,
and that these could be used as complements to promote loan growth at the country
level.
[Please insert Table 11 about here]
4.9 Further Robustness
In Table 12, we further subject our findings to a battery of robustness tests. All specifica-
tions shown utilize the same set of control variables as used in our baseline specifications
in Table 4, considering now either alternative estimation techniques or alternative mea-
sures of market power.
A possible remaining identification issue might be the dynamic nature of the lending-
funding growth gap. To account for these dynamics, we include the first lag of the
dependent variable among the regressors and use the GMM estimators for dynamic
panels from Arellano and Bond (1991). In our analysis, we use the two-step difference
GMM estimator with robust standard errors corrected using the method of Windmeijer
(2005). The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions suggests the validity and strength
secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm as opposed to other
creditors such as government or workers. Finally, management does not retain the administration of its
property pending the resolution of the reorganization.
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of our instruments. In column I, we show the results which are qualitatively similar to
the baseline estimates.
In columns II and III we use the subcomponents of market power (average price of
bank activities and marginal cost, respectively) in place of the Lerner index. In column
IV we use the Lerner index with deposits and short term funding, in column V we use the
Lerner index with financial capital, in column VI the Lerner index with financial capital
including country fixed effects when estimating the marginal cost, in column VII the
Lerner index obtained from the dual-output cost function, in column VIII the adjusted
Lerner index, and in column IX the Boone indicator.24 In all cases, the impact of market
power for the average bank is estimated to be negative and significant. Furthermore,
the non-linear term of market power is estimated to be positive and significant except
in column VI where it comes in as marginally insignificant.
[Please insert Table 12 about here]
5 Discussion
All companies, not only financial ones, face variations in the availability of external
finance. The main contribution of our paper is in analyzing the role market power plays
for a company’s ability to cope with these variations. In our study, the “company” is
a bank, i.e. a financial intermediary, for which we focus on its lending-funding growth
24Koetter et al. (2012) have argued that the conventional approach of computing the Lerner index
assumes both profit efficiency (optimal choice of prices) and cost efficiency (optimal choice of inputs by
firms). As a result, the estimated price-cost margins do not correctly measure the true extent of market
power. The argument reflects a distinction pointed out by Lerner (1934b) himself, who states that “for
practical purposes we must read monopoly power not as potential monopoly, but as monopoly in force”.
To that end, Koetter et al. (2012) propose an adjustment that results in the efficiency-adjusted Lerner
index:
Adjusted Lerneri =
πi + tci −mciqi
φi + tci
where π is the profit of bank i at time t, tc is total cost, mc is marginal cost and q is total output. Like
the standard Lerner index, the adjusted Lerner ranges from zero to one, with larger values indicating
greater market power.
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gap. On the one hand, our results have implications for the choice of external finance by
non-financial corporations: to reduce the funding risk enterprises should either choose
highly competitive banks or work with those few that are extremely powerful. This is of
relevance as external finance is known to affect corporate investment and productivity
(Duchin et al., 2010; Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; Levine and Warusawitharana, 2014),
and thus firms would benefit from stable and reliable sources of finance.
On the other hand, our approach is directly applicable to non-financial corporations
themselves. Based on the above-cited literature on the relation between external finance
and corporate productivity, we may wish to focus on the production-funding growth
gap. Denote Yt the company’s output and assume it depends on the stock of externally
sourced capital Bt and internal capital Kt, with the relationship given by the standard
production function Yt = At · (Kt +Bt)β, where At is the productivity parameter and
β is the elasticity of output to the overall capital. The similarity with our equation
(3) that determines the amount of loans on the balance sheet of the bank is obvious,
apart from the exponent β, which does not allow one to straightforwardly proceed to
equation (4) in discrete time. In continuous time, however, taking logs and differentiating
the production function equation, and subtracting the growth rate of external finance
denoted by bt from both sides, produces
yt − bt = at + β ·
Kt
Bt +Kt
· (kt − bt)− (1− β) · bt. (7)
Equation (7) is analogous to our equation (4) that gives rise to the analysis of the
two channels that explain the impact of market power on the lending-funding gap. The
left-hand side of (7) is the production-funding growth gap, and the right-hand side con-
sists of the productivity change at (which corresponds to portfolio rebalancing in the
case of a bank), and the substitution of external resources with internal capital (which
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corresponds to recapitalization in the financial intermediary case).25 The remainder of
our analysis is then, in general terms, about the impact of market power on these two
channels, and through them on the ability of corporations to maintain capital-intensive
production unchanged or increased in times of severe distress to external funding. Direct
availability of data on financial intermediaries and less restrictive assumptions required
to construct our base equation (3) make the analysis of financial intermediaries some-
what more straightforward than that of non-financial corporations. However, if the
relationships we have uncovered in this paper hold universally, we would also expect
competitive companies and those with high market power to be able to more flexibly
adjust to a changing financial environment. With this new insight from the banking
sector, more research into the potential relationship between market power, external
finance and corporate performance is desired. To date, we do not know much about
this relationship in corporate finance in general (where Ovtchinnikov (2010) is a rare
exception studying the link between competition and firms’ financial decisions, but not
productivity) and for the financial industry in particular (Berger et al. (2019) is an ex-
ception studying the effects of competition on capital management in banks, but not on
lending).
With a focus on corporate-banking relationships, our results complement the empir-
ical literature on relationship lending reviewed in Sette and Gobbi (2015), where higher
competition dampens the smoothing effect of relationship lending. Our findings suggest
that when accounting for overall lending rather than just one component of it, i.e., rela-
tionship lending, more competition may actually enhance the smoothing capacity of the
banking sector via an increase in the overall lending during periods of falling deposits.
25Note that the third term on the right-hand side, (1− β) · bt, indicates that the overall impact of the
variation in external funding depends on the elasticity of production to capital; moreover, in comparison
to (4), we do not have the overall growth term in (7) as we now operate with derivatives, i.e. marginal
changes in continuous time.
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Focusing more specifically on the smoothing capacity of banks, our findings provide a
challenge to the theoretical literature that suggested an inverse relationship between the
degree of competition and banks’ smoothing ability (e.g. Allen and Gale (1997)). Our
results imply a more complex non-linear and asymmetric (over the cycle) relationship
between smoothing ability and the degree of competition, with more competitive banks
possessing higher smoothing ability than banks with higher market power during periods
of falling deposits while, at the same time, a few super-power banks are characterized by
higher smoothing ability than banks with some market power during such downturns.
During periods of rising deposits, however, higher market power for the average bank
enhances smoothing and thus serves to limit amplification and the accumulation of risk
in the economy, consistent with Allen and Gale (1997).
Last but not least, in relation to the literature emphasizing the role banks may
play in accumulating risk in the economic system, our results imply that certain bank
characteristics such as higher market power, may serve to induce more prudent lending
practices that help limit the build-up of risk in the banking system during periods of
rising deposits.
6 Conclusion
Variation across the degree of competition faced by individual banks in different envi-
ronments over time has enabled us to investigate banks’ smoothing ability and accu-
mulation of risk during periods of falling or rising deposits in relation to their market
power. Our answer to the questions posed in the introduction as to which banks tend to
smooth/amplify shocks or reduce/accumulate risk and when, is contingent on the overall
economic conditions.
Using activity restrictions at the country-year level to obtain exogenous variation in
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market power, we have shown that for most banks market power has a negative impact
on the lending-funding growth gap, implying that more competition for these banks
may help smooth adverse shocks to deposits and will tend to amplify positive shocks to
deposits. Since more competitive banks are more likely to have a positive lending-funding
growth gap, they will also contribute to the build-up of risk in the banking system during
periods of rising deposits. That is, more competitive banks along with “superpower”
banks, are more likely to smooth shocks during economic downturns associated with
falling deposits, but at the cost of amplification and risk accumulation during periods of
rising deposits. By contrast, banks with higher market power (but not “superpower”)
are more likely than other banks to smooth shocks and reduce the build-up of risk during
booms associated with rising deposits, but at the cost of amplification of adverse effects
during periods of falling deposits.
The asymmetric (stronger) effect of market power we find for periods of deposit
decline as compared to periods of deposit growth implies, however, that for the average
bank, the smoothing role of competition when deposits are falling is quantitatively more
important than the problematic positive impact of competition on amplification and risk
accumulation when deposits are growing. Similarly, since in episodes of deposit outflow
there is also a starker contrast between the impact of market power for “superpower”
banks versus the average bank, the presence of “superpower” banks in the economy will
matter more for smoothing in periods of falling deposits than for amplification and the
build-up of risk in periods of rising deposits.
In addition, the asymmetry in the market power effect is informative about the role
played by the “borrowing/recapitalization” versus “portfolio rebalancing” channels. If
portfolio rebalancing had been the only active channel, we would see a more symmet-
ric response of the lending-funding growth gap to changes in market power than we
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actually observe in the data. Instead, the asymmetry we find suggests that the “borrow-
ing/recapitalization” channel is also active. Interestingly, the size effects (traditionally
associated with economies of scale in banking) are observable through the portfolio rebal-
ancing channel rather than through the borrowing/recapitalization one. This dichotomy
stresses that the market power effects we observe, go well beyond, and work differently,
from any effects attributable to the size of financial institutions.
Based on the above-described results, future research would be well advised to in-
vestigate further the role market power plays for the ability of corporations, not only
financial, to respond to fluctuations in external funding, and to focus on building macroe-
conomic models that incorporate a heterogeneous financial sector in order to provide a
more complete understanding of the link that exists between individual banks’ char-
acteristics, smoothing or amplification of shocks, and the accumulation of risk in the
economy. In particular, such models should be able to match asymmetric effects such as
the ones uncovered here, and the novel finding regarding the potentially enhancing role
of competition for banks’ smoothing ability during downturns.
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Tables
Table 1: Definitions and sources of main variables
Name Description Data source
Panel A: Variables used in the derivation of market power
Earning assets Natural logarithm of deflated total earning assets. Bankscope
Price of output Total income divided by total earning assets. Bankscope
Expenses Natural logarithm of deflated total interest expenses and total non-interest
expenses.
Bankscope
Price of deposits Natural logarithm of total interest expenses divided by total customer de-
posits.
Bankscope
Price of borrowed funds Natural logarithm of total interest expenses divided by short-term funding. Bankscope
Price of labor Natural logarithm of personnel expenses divided by total assets. Bankscope
Price of physical capital Natural logarithm of overheads minus personnel expenses divided by fixed
assets.
Bankscope
Price of financial capital Natural logarithm of equity divided by total assets Bankscope
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power
Lending-funding growth gap The difference between total loan growth and deposits growth. Bankscope
Corporate loans funding gap The difference between corporate loans growth and deposits growth. Bankscope
Personal loans funding gap The difference between personal loans growth and deposits growth. Bankscope
Mortgage loans funding gap The difference between mortgage loans growth and deposits growth. Bankscope
Loan growth The annual forward change in the volume of total bank loans between t+1
to t.
Bankscope
Deposits growth The annual forward change in the volume of total bank deposits between
t+1 to t.
Bankscope
Non-performing loans The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans per bank and year. Bankscope
Loan-loss provisions Loan-loss provisions divided by total loans. Bankscope
Lerner index The ability of an individual bank to charge a price above marginal cost. Own calculations
Dual-output Lerner Variant of the Lerner index that adopts a dual-output cost function. Own calculations
Adjusted Lerner Variant of the Lerner index which allows for the possibility that firms do
not choose the prices and input levels in a profit-maximizing way.
Own calculations
Boone indicator The elasticity of profits to marginal costs. Own calculations
CR5 The five-bank concentration ratio. Own calculation
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets. Own calculation
Equity Natural logarithm of bank’s equity. Bankscope
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets. Bankscope
OBSI size Natural logarithm of the off-balance sheet items. Bankscope
Big bank A dummy variable equal to one when a bank belong to top-10 pc per country
year
Own calculation
GDP growth Real GDP growth (annual %). World Development
Indicators
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Z-score (3 years) The natural logarithm of the Z-score measures the distance from insolvency
and is calculated as Zi,t =
ROAi,t+(E/A)i,t
σ(ROAi,t)
, where ROA is return on assets
of bank i at time t, E/A denotes the equity to asset ratio and σ(ROA) is the
standard deviation of return on assets with a three-years rolling time win-
dow. Similarly, for Z-score (4 years) and Z-score (5 years) we calculate the
standard deviation of return on assets with a four-years or five-years rolling
time window, respectively. A higher Z-score implies a lower probability of
insolvency.
Owns Calculations
Banking crisis A dummy variable equal to one when a country suffers from a banking crisis
with a two years clear window (t,t+1).
Laeven and Valencia
(2018)
Legal rights Legal rights includes indicators which measure the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include percep-




Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights following Djankov et al. (2007). The
index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and
is constructed as at January for every year from 1992 to 2015.
Djankov et al. (2007)
Domestic demand Domestic demand is the annual growth (%) of final consumption, investment
and stock building expenditures by the private and general government sec-
tors in real terms.
OECD
Loan & advances to banks Interest-earning balances with central banks and loans and advances to
banks net of impairment value including loans pledged to banks as collateral.
Bankscope
Reserves for impaired This ratio relates impairment reserves to non performing or impaired loans. Bankscope
loans/Gross loans The higher this ratio is, the better and the more comfortable one should feel
about the vulnerability of the capital base.
Impaired loans/Gross loans This is a measure of the ratio of total loans which are impaired. The lower
this figure is the better the asset quality is.
Bankscope
Panel C: Instrumental variables used in the analysis of market power
Activity restrictions The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory
restrictions on bank participation in: (i) securities activities, (ii) insurance
activities, (iii) real estate activities, and (iv) bank ownership of non-financial
firms. These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohib-
ited and is assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4, respectively. The index ranges
from 0 to 16, with larger values denoting more stringent restrictions.
Barth et al. (2013)
Supervisory power Index of the powers of the supervisor of the banking sector, reflecting
whether the supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions
to prevent and correct problems in the banking sector. Takes values ranges
from 0 to 16, with higher values reflecting more supervisory power.
Barth et al. (2013)
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variables Level Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Variables used in the derivation of market power
Earning assets Bank 59,397 12.276 2.158 6.839 21.38
Price of output Bank 59,397 0.085 0.08 0.005 4.257
Expenses Bank 59,397 9.311 2.058 4.561 18.414
Price of deposits Bank 59,397 -3.715 1.213 -8.835 3.833
Price of borrowed funds Bank 59,397 -3.875 1.094 -8.835 0.741
Price of labour Bank 59,397 -4.343 0.552 -7.541 -1.28
Price of physical capital Bank 59,397 -0.083 0.928 -2.063 8.934
Price of financial capital Bank 59,397 -2.396 0.507 -8.396 -0.047
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power
Lending-funding growth gap Bank 59,397 0.474 18.925 -99.892 99.99
Corporate loans funding gap Bank 18,511 0.274 21.067 -95.892 97.506
Personal loans funding gap Bank 18,625 0.115 19.470 -94.892 99.769
Mortgage loans funding gap Bank 18,534 0.088 19.473 -93.892 94.769
Loan growth Bank 58,801 8.651 19.757 -99.764 100
Deposits growth Bank 58,792 8.22 19.927 -100 100
Non-performing loans (%) Bank 59,397 4.187 6.65 0 100
Loan-loss provision (%) Bank 54,081 0.518 0.986 0 47.38
Lerner index Bank 59,397 0.25 0.114 -0.199 0.924
Lerner index with deposits Bank 59,397 0.25 0.114 -0.2 0.924
Lerner index with financial capital Bank 59,393 0.252 0.114 -0.199 0.926
Lerner index with country FE Bank 59,391 0.236 0.115 -0.229 0.915
Dual-output Lerner index Bank 56,048 0.25 0.112 -0.2 0.92
Adjusted Lerner Bank 57,761 0.205 0.119 -0.200 0.919
Boone Indicator Bank 59,397 -0.251 0.188 -0.901 0.039
CR5 Country 49,889 0.477 0.273 0.032 1
ROA Bank 59,397 0.012 0.015 -0.46 0.326
Equity Bank 59,397 10.689 1.763 5.075 19.148
Bank size Bank 59,397 13.084 1.833 7.786 21.744
OBSI size Bank 54,463 9.746 2.689 -1.583 21.466
Big Bank Bank 59,397 0.501 0.219 0 1
GDP growth Country 59,392 2.391 3.117 -14.814 34.5
Z-score (3 years) Bank 59,290 3.694 1.196 -17.239 14.737
Z-score (4 years) Bank 59,293 3.611 1.185 -17.239 14.737
Z-score (5 years) Bank 59,296 3.559 1.183 -17.239 14.737
Banking crisis Country 59,397 0.045 0.207 0.000 1.000
Legal rights Country 51,997 11.793 2.720 2.000 19.000
Creditor rights Country 58,634 1.583 0.821 0.000 4.000
Domestic demand Country 47,170 1.926 2.933 -23.309 18.279
Loans & advances to banks Bank 502 8.562 2.995 0.000 17.231
Reserves for impaired loans/Gross loans Bank 24,749 3.581 4.618 -0.480 95.240
Impaired loans/Gross loans Bank 24,341 5.857 7.523 0.000 100.000
Panel C: Instrumental variables used in the analysis of market power
Activity restrictions Country 49,646 10.136 3.003 0 16
Supervisory power Country 48,301 12.074 2.229 4 16
The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are
defined in Table 1.
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Table 5: Results from 2SLS model
Full sample Deposits DOWN Deposits UP
I II III
Panel A: First-stage results
Activity restrictions 0.241*** 0.038** 0.266***
[5.501] [2.100] [4.422]
Supervisory power 0.330*** 0.112*** 0.344***
[6.731] [2.471] [5.211]
R-squared 0.775 0.944 0.813
Year FE Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y
Panel B: Second-stage results
̂Lerner index -8.971*** -13.075** -8.344***
[-3.843] [-2.292] [-3.203]
̂Lerner index squared 12.479*** 21.273** 10.116**
[2.929] [2.262] [2.341]
Observations 28,935 9,731 17,238
Hansen IV (P-Value) 0.786 0.884 0.705
Chow test (P-value) 0.000 0.000
H0 : β̂
Deposit Down = β̂Deposit UP
Turning point (Lerner index) 0.359 0.307 0.412
Join Significance (Lerner index) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Control Variables (Bank-country) Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y
Clustered standard errors Bank-Country Bank-Country Bank-Country
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) using a 2SLS regressions. We
estimate the regression [GLi,j,t+1−GDi,j,t+1] = αf+M̂Pi,j,t+M̂P 2i,j,t+NPLi,j,t−1+Xi,j,t+
Zj,t + εi,j,t , where i is an index specific to the bank; j is an index specific to country; and
t is an index for years. MPi,j,t, measures the Lerner index, MP
2
i,j,t, measures the Lerner
index squared and NPLi,j,t−1, measures non-performing loans. The first stage regressions
are given in Panel A. Activity restrictions and supervisory power range from 1999-2012 at
the country-year level. All variables are defined in Table 1. In columns II and III, we re-
strict our analysis only to periods with declining deposits (< 0) and rising deposits (> 0),
respectively. To test for differences in coefficients across subgroups we use the Chow test.
All regressions are estimated with High Dimensional Fixed Effects (HDFE), include the
control variables that are reported in Table 4 and fixed effects as noted in the lower part
of the table to control for different levels of unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the bank-country level. The *,**,*** marks denote the statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and % level, respectively.
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Table 8: Effects of domestic demand and loan quality on the lending-funding growth
gap
I II III IV V
Domestic Interbank Forward Relative LLP
demand loans looking size
Non-performing loans -0.323*** -4.998***
[-5.700] [-38.885]
Lerner index -15.745*** -96.561*** -16.573*** -14.208** -11.131***
[-3.195] [-26.390] [-2.856] [-2.221] [-2.846]
Lerner index squared 18.811*** 30.929*** 25.967*** 21.434** 19.567***
[4.155] [8.060] [2.669] [2.238] [2.661]
Domestic demand 0.649***
[3.904]
Loans & advances to banks -2.000***
[-140.038]
Reserves for impaired loans/ Gross loans -0.239**
[-2.006]




Observations 36,564 324 20,472 17,999 38,009
R-squared 0.181 0.246 0.347 0.352 0.280
F-stat 37.62 8.277 8.235 28.78
Turning point (Lerner index) 0.418 1.560 0.032 0.331 0.284
Joint significance (Lerner index) 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.080 0.000
Control Variables (Bank-Country) Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N N N
Country FE Y N N N N
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Country*Year FE N Y Y Y Y
Clustered standard errors Country Country Country Country Country
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). We estimate the regression [GLi,j,t+1 −
GDi,j,t+1] = αf + MPi,j,t + MP
2
i,j,t + NPLi,j,t−1 + Xi,j,t + Zj,t + εi,j,t , where i is an index specific to the
bank; j is an index specific to country; and t is an index for years. MPi,j,t, measures the Lerner index,
MP 2i,j,t, measures the Lerner index squared and NPLi,j,t−1, measures non-performing loans. All variables
are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with High Dimensional Fixed Effects (HDFE), include
the control variables that are reported in Table 4 and fixed effects as noted in the lower part of the table
to control for different levels of unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
country level. The *,**,*** marks denote the statistical significance at the 10, 5, and % level, respectively.
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Table 9: Effects of bank size and risk on the lending-funding growth gap
I II III IV V
Categories Bank size Bank size Bank risk
=High =Low
Non-performing loans -0.142** -0.145 -0.133** -0.136** -0.135**
[-2.401] [-1.149] [-2.308] [-2.331] [-2.330]
Lerner index -13.119** -15.173*** -15.302*** -15.112*** -15.252***
[-2.393] [-3.269] [-3.773] [-3.753] [-3.765]
Lerner index squared 14.569* 9.276 19.998*** 19.521*** 20.083***
[1.745] [1.077] [3.793] [3.695] [3.775]
Z-score (3 years) 0.332***
[4.229]
Z-score (4 years) 0.250***
[3.015]
Z-score (5 years) 0.397***
[4.210]
Observations 22,179 21,290 43,540 43,542 43,544
R-squared 0.309 0.286 0.272 0.272 0.272
F-stat 10.28 16.40 27.12 22.38 23.14
Turning point (Lerner index) 0.450 0.817 0.382 0.387 0.379
Joint significance (Lerner index) 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Control Variables (Bank-Country) Y Y Y Y Y
Bank FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year*Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered standard errors Country Country Country Country Country
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). We estimate the regression [GLi,j,t+1 −
GDi,j,t+1] = αf +MPi,j,t +MP
2
i,j,t +NPLi,j,t−1 +Xi,j,t + Zj,t + εi,j,t , where i is an index specific to
the bank; j is an index specific to country; and t is an index for years. MPi,j,t, measures the Lerner in-
dex, MP 2i,j,t, measures the Lerner index squared and NPLi,j,t−1, measures non-performing loans. All
variables are defined in Table 1. In columns I and II we restrict our sample to cases where bank size
is above (high) or below (low) the mean, respectively. In columns III-V, we add the z-score with dif-
ferent rolling years to control for the bank risk. All regressions are estimated with High Dimensional
Fixed Effects (HDFE), include the control variables that are reported in Table 4 and fixed effects as
noted in the lower part of the table to control for different levels of unobserved heterogeneity. Stan-
dard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. The *,**,*** marks denote the statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and % level, respectively.
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Table 11: Effects of institutional environment on the lending-funding growth gap
I II
Interaction variable: Legal rights Creditor Rights
Non-performing loans -0.096*** -0.146***
[-2.761] [-2.633]
Lerner index -30.119** -17.193***
[-2.397] [-5.543]
Lerner index * Variable 1.965* 17.564***
[1.731] [2.628]
Lerner index squared 48.907** 20.798***
[2.368] [3.398]





Turning point (Lerner index) 0.307 0.413
Joint significance (Lerner index) 0.050 0.000
Control Variables (Bank-Country) Y Y
Bank FE Y Y
Year*Country FE Y Y
Clustered standard errors Country Country
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). We esti-
mate the regression [GLi,j,t+1 −GDi,j,t+1] = αf +MPi,j,t +MP 2i,j,t +
NPLi,j,t−1 + Xi,j,t + Zj,t + εi,j,t , where i is an index specific to the
bank; j is an index specific to country; and t is an index for years.
MPi,j,t, measures the Lerner index, MP
2
i,j,t, measures the Lerner in-
dex squared and NPLi,j,t−1, measures the non-performing loans. All
variables are defined in Table 1. In column I and II, we interact the
Lerner index with the legal rights index and creditor rights, respec-
tively. All regressions are estimated with High Dimensional Fixed Ef-
fects (HDFE), include the control variables that are reported in Table
4 and fixed effects as noted in the lower part of the table to control
for different levels of unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the country level. The *,**,*** marks denote
the statistical significance at the 10, 5, and % level, respectively.
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Appendices
A Further details on the lending-funding growth gap
The lending-funding growth gap, lt − dt is best understood as a measure of sensitivity,









For example, banks with low constant elasticity of lending to deposit inflow, ld = c <
1 always smooth shocks as for them l − d = (c − 1) · d < 0 for positive d and l − d > 0
for negative d (see Figure A.1), while banks with ld = c > 1 always amplify these as for
them l − d > 0 for positive d and l − d < 0 for negative d (see again Figure A.1). We
note that even though the elasticity parameter ld is not well-defined for values of d close
to zero, the linear difference l−d provides a similar insight into the relationship between
lending and deposit growth rates without ruling out small deposit growth rates.
If instead of using the lending-funding growth gap, we tried to capture the sensitivity
of lending to deposit inflows using the elasticity measure ltdt , then
lt
dt
> 1 would refer to
amplification and ltdt < 1 to smoothing, including the case when lt and dt are of opposite
signs, ltdt < 0 < 1.
To derive the link between the relative customer funding gap, Lt−DtLt , and the lending-





, is given by a change





































· (dt − lt) =
1
1 + lt
· (lt − dt) . (A.3)
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Figure A.1: Types of banks with regards to smoothing/amplification.
Notes: Type (i) banks almost always smooth shocks, type (ii) banks always amplify shocks, type (iii)
banks are more likely to smooth negative shocks and amplify positive ones, while type (iv) banks are
more likely to amplify negative shocks and smooth positive ones.

















ratio of gross growth rates cannot be converted to elasticity ltdt , providing an additional
argument in favor of using the lending-funding growth gap as a measure of sensitivity.






> 0, while a negative lt − dt reduces the funding gap. Persistence in the
positive sign of lt − dt thus leads to a build-up of the customer funding gap in the long
run.
The Bank of England (BoE, 2010) emphasizes the build-up of the relative funding
gap in the major UK banks just prior to the global financial crisis of 2008-10. In Figure
A.2, the period 2003-2007 prior to the financial crisis, is marked with a persistently
positive lending-funding growth gap, l−d, especially for banks with high market power.
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Similarly, in Figure A.2, a persistently positive (l − d)-gap is observed in the nineties,
after the early nineties recession and preceding the early 2000s recession. The growing
or large customer funding gap is of concern as it requires resorting to market sources
of liquidity which may be scarce especially if long-term funding is required, thus raising
the risk of systemic bank failures (Allen et al., 2012). In Albertazzi and Bottero (2014)
banks with higher funding gap restricted their lending in the aftermath of the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy by more than those with a lower gap. The link between the lending-
funding growth gap and the customer funding gap is therefore of policy relevance as (1)
it may indicate potential build-up of liquidity risks, and (2) knowing the determinants
of lt−dt helps predict the change in the funding gap and through it, the accumulation of
risk. Note that by Equation (A.3), banks that are likely to have a larger lt− dt, are also
likely to experience a higher funding gap than their counterparts with the same leverage,
as given by DtLt , but lower lt − dt. Here
Dt
Lt
measures a bank’s reliance on deposits as
the source of funds. Large banks can therefore end up with large funding gaps, as in
Albertazzi et al. (2014), if they have a larger lt−dt (which may occur if they are reluctant
to reduce lending in response to a reduction in deposit intake), especially if they initially
have a large portion of deposits in their funding portfolio.
An important provision of the Basel III regulatory framework is the Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR), i.e. the ratio of available stable funding, ASF , to required
stable funding, RSF . The standard minimum requirement is ASFRSF ≥ 100%. ASF is
the weighted sum of capital and other liabilities, whereby capital and long-term (over
1 year maturity) liabilities receive a weight of 1, other deposits are weighted with .90-
.95, and most remaining liabilities receive weights of .5 and below. Similarly, RSF is
the weighted sum of the bank’s assets, whereby long-term (over 1 year maturity) assets
and non-performing loans receive a weight of 1, relatively risky performing loans and
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Figure A.2: The dynamics of the (l − d)-gap.
Source: Authors’ calculations, see details in Section 3.2
commodities receive a weight of .85, mortgages and less risky loans receive a weight of
.65, and so on, with decreasing weights for decreasing liquidity risk of asset classes (see
BIS, 2014, for details). Assuming loans, L, deposits, D, and capital, K, dominate a
bank’s balance sheet, we can write ASF = K + ωD · D and RSF = ωL · L, where ωD
and ωL are adjustment coefficients arising from the weighting of some of the loans and




K + ωD ·D
ωL · L
≥ 100%, (A.5)
which can be written as K ≥ ωL · L− ωD ·D, or, by dividing both sides by ωD · L and
re-arranging, as KωD·L ≥
ωL
ωD











The right-hand side in inequality (A.6) is the relative customer-funding gap, already
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shown above to be related to the lending-funding growth gap, the focus of our paper.
The left-hand side consists of an adjusted leverage ratio and a bank-specific constant term
in the brackets. The term in the brackets reflects the composition of assets and liabilities,
and is close to zero if maturity structures of assets and liabilities are close to each other,
i.e. if ωL ≈ ωD. Now a positive lending-funding growth gap implies a growing right-
hand side. If loans are growing, this implies meeting the NSFR requirement is harder,
equivalent to a drop in the NSFR ratio. If lending is in decline, a positive (l− d)-gap is
less of an issue. Note however, that NSFR requirements have been introduced to prevent
excessive increase in lending, hence our analysis of the (l − d)-gap is of relevance.
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B Estimation of marginal cost
We estimate marginal cost using a semi-parametric estimation methods. We use the
following log-linear cost function:






it + eit (B.1)
In equation B.1, C is the total cost of the bank i at time t, measured by the deflated
total interest expenses and total noninterest expenses; Q is the total output of each bank,
measured by the deflated total earning assets; wl is the price of labor, measured by the
ratio of personnel expenses to total assets; wk is the price of physical capital, measured
by the ratio of overheads minus personnel expenses to fixed assets; and wd is the price of
intermediation funds, measured by the ratio of total interest expenses to total customer
deposits. In alternative specifications, we also include the price of financial capital, as
measured by the ratio of equity capital to total assets, as well different levels of fixed
effects, the results being unaffected. All variables are defined in Table 1.
Equation B.1 has parametric parts (those related to the input prices) and a non-
parametric part (that related to bank output). The variable z, which is the so-called
smoothing parameter, is crucial for the identification of the model and must be a variable
that is highly correlated with a2 and considerably varies by bank-year. Delis et al. (2016)
propose using z = lnwlit+ lnw
k
it, which is intuitive given the high potential correlation of
input prices with the output elasticity of costs. We use the same approach and we also
verify that using each input price separately yields similar results. Further, we impose
the linear homogeneity restriction in input prices by normalizing total cost and the input
prices by the price of deposits before taking logs. From equation B.1, we can obtain the
marginal cost at the bank-year level as ∂Cit∂Q = a2(
Cit
Qit
) to calculate the Lerner index.
The actual estimation methodology of the semi-parametric model follows the paradigm
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of Fan and Zhang (1999). Specifically, and by dropping the t subscript for simplicity,
we can write equation B.1 as follows:
Yi = (Yi|Wi) + ei = Xiβ1 + Viβ2(Zi) + ei (B.2)
In this equation, β2 is a function of one or more variables with dimension k added to
the vector Z. The linear part in equation B.2 is in line with the idea of the semiparametric
model as opposed to a nonparametric model (e.g., Zhang et al. (2002)). The coefficients
of the linear part are estimated in the first step as averages of the polynomial fitting by
using an initial bandwidth chosen by cross-validation (Hoover et al. (1998)). We then
average these estimates β1i and β2i to receive β1 and β2 in equation B.2.
In the second step we use the average estimates and B.2 to redefine the dependent
variable as follows:
Y ∗i ≡ Yi −Xiβ̂i = Viβ2 (z) + e∗i (B.3)
where the asterisks denote the redefined dependent variable and error term. β2(z) is










































tion B.4 represents a local constant estimator, where k(z, λ) is a kernel function, λ is
the smoothing parameter (chosen by generalized cross validation) for sample size n, and
k is the dimension of zi.
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In B.5, β̂2 (z) is a least squares estimator obtained by regressing Y
∗
j on Vj , using the
observations of (Y ∗j ,Vj) for which the corresponding zj is close to z, that is, |zj − z| ≤ λ.
Therefore, to estimate β̂2 (z), we only use observations within this sliding window. Note
that no assumptions are made about this estimator globally, but locally within the
sliding window we assume that β̂2 (z) can be well-approximated. Also, because β̂2 (z) is a
smooth function of z, |β2 (zj)− β2 (z)| is small when |zj − z| is small. The condition that
nλ is large ensures that we have sufficient observations within the interval |zj − z| < λ
when β̂2 (zj) is close to β̂2 (z). Therefore, under the conditions λ → 0 and nλk → ∞
(for k1), the local least squares regression of Y ∗j on Vj provides a consistent estimate
of β2 (z) (for a proof, see Li et al. (2002)). Therefore, the estimation method is usually
referred to as a local regression. The main merit of this approach is that it is quite more
flexible than the usual parametric functional forms (e.g., the translog) and this can lead
to substantial improvement in the precision of the estimates.
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C Tables
Table C1 of this appendix presents the number of banks used, while Table C2 presents
pairwise correlations of the main variables. Finally, Table C3 is similar to Table 10
in the main text with only one difference: we now interact the crisis dummy with the
NPL variable, thus explicitly studying the difference in the impact of quality of loans
on our main variable of interest during crises and crisis-free times. The interaction
term is insignificant in the baseline specification, yet becomes significant once we control
for fixed effects at country*year and country*year*specialisation levels, with a stronger
impact of the interaction term is stronger when deposits decline.
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Table C4: Average estimates of market power
Percentile distribution
10 25 50 75 90
Year Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index
1988 0.160 0.043 0.131 0.184 0.184 0.264
1989 0.135 0.039 0.104 0.161 0.161 0.219
1990 0.114 0.048 0.066 0.137 0.138 0.182
1991 0.129 0.059 0.104 0.129 0.150 0.150
1992 0.146 0.087 0.136 0.150 0.150 0.164
1993 0.187 0.143 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.263
1994 0.206 0.138 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.243
1995 0.198 0.160 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.227
1996 0.209 0.176 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.241
1997 0.200 0.126 0.184 0.197 0.228 0.255
1998 0.178 0.135 0.162 0.162 0.199 0.234
1999 0.210 0.142 0.173 0.222 0.254 0.254
2000 0.198 0.150 0.150 0.223 0.230 0.232
2001 0.211 0.143 0.143 0.217 0.267 0.267
2002 0.244 0.166 0.166 0.214 0.323 0.323
2003 0.263 0.180 0.182 0.251 0.341 0.341
2004 0.256 0.191 0.193 0.249 0.306 0.311
2005 0.249 0.187 0.187 0.245 0.296 0.314
2006 0.248 0.205 0.206 0.256 0.266 0.304
2007 0.225 0.171 0.171 0.229 0.246 0.287
2008 0.223 0.159 0.176 0.214 0.236 0.285
2009 0.279 0.212 0.212 0.259 0.362 0.362
2010 0.294 0.210 0.255 0.277 0.364 0.364
2011 0.293 0.206 0.264 0.267 0.367 0.388
2012 0.294 0.208 0.253 0.283 0.366 0.385
2013 0.306 0.218 0.269 0.282 0.380 0.406
2014 0.312 0.237 0.273 0.279 0.368 0.398
2015 0.321 0.218 0.290 0.301 0.404 0.417
Mean 0.249 0.159 0.191 0.244 0.296 0.362
This table reports average estimates of market power by year. Averages are obtained from the
bank-year level estimates of market power using the Lerner index weighted by market shares. Higher
values reflect higher market power (lower competition).
